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Abstract:  Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the 
claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support 
octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective 
experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions 
will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give 
us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus. 
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Empirical evidence now appears to be in favour of octopus sentience: their ability to experience 
subjective mental states. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low 2012) states: “the 
weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates 
that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many 
other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates” (Low 2012, p. 2). 
 Mather (2019) lends further weight to this conclusion, bringing together the current 
research on the cognitive abilities of octopuses to argue that they possess a mind. Further than 
this, Mather goes some way towards exploring what this mind may contain. This is of primary 
interest when considering the welfare of octopuses. If octopuses are sentient, then they have a 
welfare that can be harmed or benefitted. Even if it is the case that octopuses possess multiple 
minds rather than a single unified consciousness (Favela 2019, Schwartz 2019), insofar as these 
are multiple loci of felt experience, they are still each capable of welfare, as for any members of 
a community of sentient organisms. When keeping captive octopuses, knowing what conditions 
will positively or negatively impact welfare is crucial for ensuring their quality of life. 
Understanding the mind(s) of an octopus will be essential in the development of evidence-based 
standards for care. There are currently few documents detailing husbandry standards for 
cephalopods (AITAG 2014, Fiorito et al. 2015), and we should expect these to grow and change in 
the future as we learn more about what octopuses think and feel. 
 As Mather argues, the Umwelt — or perceptual world — of the octopus is likely to be 
vastly different from our own. They do not perceive colour, but rather the plane of polarisation 
of light. They exist within an aquatic environment that allows for sensitivity to chemical and 
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mechanical cues we are not able to perceive. This means that when considering their welfare, 
these environmental conditions must be included. Current recommendations for octopus 
husbandry refer to lighting brightness and appropriate day/night cycles but have not considered 
light polarisation (AITAG 2014, Fiorito et al. 2015). Lights which appear gentle to the human eye 
may not be so within the octopus perceptual range, so light polarisation should also be measured 
and taken into account. Chemicals within the tank can affect health but may also be pleasant or 
aversive in ways we may not usually consider. Chemosensory enrichment opportunities could 
open up new avenues of exploration. Vibrations through the water can have a large impact on 
octopus health and welfare (e.g., André et al. 2011), with “noise and vibration control” forming a 
core part of the guidelines for octopus husbandry (AITAG 2014, Fiorito et al. 2015).  
 Mather also describes two of the primary needs motivating octopus behaviour — 
exploration and fear. These are very likely to impact octopus welfare and should accordingly form 
an important part of octopus husbandry. She provides evidence that octopuses have a strong 
motivation to explore, beyond simply the potential for extrinsic (food) reward. Provision of novel 
environments and objects for octopuses to explore is hence likely to be central to octopus 
welfare, to prevent boredom and frustration. The guidelines for cephalopod care recommend 
complex enriched environments (Fiorito et al. 2015); this evidence gives us reason to give this 
particular recommendation a high priority. Mather also shows that octopuses, lacking the 
protective shell of their mollusc relatives, probably often feel vulnerable; indeed they are most 
often found near suitable shelter. It will almost certainly be crucial for octopus welfare to provide 
sufficient refuge, such as opaque tank walls and shelters, to provide a feeling of safety and allow 
the opportunity to retreat (Fiorito et al. 2015). Finally, personality differences between different 
octopuses give us reason to consider their needs not just as members of a species, but as 
individuals as well. 
 These concerns are particularly relevant against the background of recent debate on 
whether octopuses should be farmed for consumption, with the desire for cheaper and more 
easily obtainable octopus meat conflicting with environmental and welfare concerns (Jacquet et 
al. 2019). Although there are currently few such farms — mostly in the trial stage — it is likely that 
their numbers will rise in the near future. Within this context, it is now important that we know 
not just that octopuses think, but also what they think. A better understanding of octopus welfare 
needs could be used to provide a stronger case against their farming if their needs cannot be met 
(as Jacquet et al. 2019 argue, they cannot). Failing that, it can also help to ensure higher welfare 
standards if such farms do inevitably arise.  
 The recognition of octopus sentience has led to legislation and regulations for their 
protection within laboratory settings (Fiorito et al. 2014). It makes sense that similar regulations 
should also be in place for the use of octopuses in farming, based on what we know about octopus 
welfare. Welfare standards thus developed can also be applied to other captive octopuses housed 
in laboratories and aquariums. The mind of an octopus may be highly different from our own, but 
it is only by trying to see the world from their point of view that we will be able to find out what 
is good for them and hence ensure their welfare. 
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